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IN HELL THERE WILL BE LAWYERS WITHOUT
CLIENTS OR LAW
Susan P. Koniak* and George M. Cohen**

I. INTRODUCTION

More than twenty years ago, moral philosopher Richard
Wasserstrom framed the debate in legal ethics by asking two questions.'
Does the lawyer's duty to zealously represent the client, constrained
only by the bounds of the law, render the lawyer "at best systematically
amoral and at worst more than occasionally immoral in ...her dealings
with the rest of mankind[?] ''2 And is the lawyer's relationship with the
client likewise morally tainted in that it generally entails domination by
the lawyer over the client rather than mutual respect? 3 Wasserstrom
answered both questions affirmatively. Though these questions have
preoccupied legal ethics scholars ever since,5 they are the wrong
questions. They were off-base when posed and, if anything, are even
more off-base today. The problem with Wasserstrom's questions is that

Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
Edward F. Hov-ey Research Professor, University of Virginia School of Law.
This Essay was previously published in substantially the same form in a collection of
essays entitled ETlIcs IN PRACTICE (Deborah Rhode ed., 2000).
1. See Richard Wasserstwm, Lawyers as Professionals:Some MoralIssues, 5 HuM. RTs. 1,
1(1975).
*

**

2. Id.
3. See id.

4. Although Wasserstrom equivocates in answering these questions, his article read in its
entirety answers both affirmatively, with an exception. See generally id. When it comes to criminal
defense lawyers, Wasserstrom argues that knowing no bounds but the law may be moral. See id.
at 6, 12.
5. See, e.g., David Luban, Paternalismand the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 454,

458 (arguing that a moral dilemma exists when a client's wishes do not meet with the attorney's
approval or the attorney's assessment of the client's interests); Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's
StandardMisconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 wis. L. REv. 1529, 1529-30 (noting that "[s]ince
Watergate, and maybe because of it," moral philosophers are increasingly interested in lawyers'
ethics).
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they presuppose individual clients and settled law. The truly troubling
questions in legal ethics arise, however, when clients are entities and the
law governing these clients and the lawyer's relationship to them is
contested. Class actions, the subject of this Essay, raise perhaps the most
troubling questions of all.
Wasserstrom wrote in the wake of Watergate. The involvement of
so many lawyers in that scandal embarrassed the profession and
prompted the American Bar Association ("ABA") to require that all law
students receive instruction in legal ethics. The ABA's legal ethics
requirement helped spark scholarship in the field, and Wasserstrom's
article was one of the first serious entries in what would soon become a
burgeoning area of research. Strangely, however, Wasserstrom, who
specifically referred to Watergate as an example of lawyer misconduct,7
and many other legal ethics scholars who followed in his path focused
on questions that had little connection to what the lawyers of Watergate
infamy did wrong."
The Watergate lawyers did not go wrong because professional
ethics condoned all activity on the client's behalf short of actually
breaking the law, Wasserstrom's first indictment of legal ethics. 9 They
went wrong because their personal morality condoned even
lawbreaking.' ° As for Wasserstrom's second indictment of legal ethics,
the domination critique," even if the Watergate lawyers had represented
Richard Nixon in his personal capacity, the moral taint in that
relationship would surely not have been that the lawyers imposed their
will on their client. But even if they could have, none of the Watergate

6. See ABA STANDARDS FOR THE APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS AND INTERPRETATIONS,
Standard 302(a)(iv) (1995), discussed in Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and
Commitment in the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 148 (1996).
7. See Wasserstrom, supranote 1, at 2-3.
8. See id. at 11.
9. See supra text accompanying note 2.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 51-52 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam)
(affirming conviction of former Attorney General John Mitchell and other top advisors to President
Nixon for conspiracy to obstruct justice and perjury); see also United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d
973, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (reversing and remanding conspiracy conviction based on error
in failing to sever his trial from the others, but noting that Mardian admitted to being "less than
honest"); United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (denying motion to
withdraw guilty pleas and characterizing appellants as "the foot soldiers of the Watergate Breakin"); United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc) (affirming conviction
for "illegal interception of oral and wire communications," burglary, and conspiracy); United States
v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc) (affirming conviction for conspiracy,
burglary, and "unlawful endeavor to intercept oral and wire communications").
11. See supra text accompanying note 3.
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lawyers were representing President Nixon in his personal capacity. 2
Those whose lawbreaking was even arguably undertaken as part of
representing a client 3 had clients that the law had created, such as the
United States or the Office of the President, 4 and thus had lawyer-client
relationships not subject to Wasserstrom's paternalism critique nor
amenable to his remedy: a relationship in which the lawyer listened
more and dominated less.' s
The questions articulated by Wasserstrom and accepted by so many
legal scholars as central to legal ethics do not fit the patterns of later
lawyer scandals any better than they fit Watergate. Just as in Watergate,
lawyer involvement in the savings and loan debacle 6 and in the tobacco
industry's longstanding pattern of deception 7 involved zealousness not
12. See Wasserstrom, supranote 1, at 11.
13. Some of the Watergate lawyers were convicted for acts that were taken by them while
acting not as lawyers but in some other capacity. See, e.g., United States v. Chapin, 515 F.2d 1274,
1277 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Donald Segretti, although a lawyer, was convicted for activity undertaken by
him as a campaign worker, including:
such disruptive activities as printing and distributing large posters saying "Help Muskie
Support Bussing [sic] More Children Now," supposedly distributed by the Mothers
Backing Muskie Committee; writing a letter on Citizens for Muskie stationery accusing
Senator Jackson of being a homosexual and Senator Humphrey of cavorting with
prostitutes at the expense of lobbyists; and putting out a "Humphrey" press release
stating that Representative Shirley Chisholm had been committed to a mental institution
in the early 1950's after being detained in Richmond, Virginia as a transvestite and that
she was still under psychiatric care.
Il at 1277-78. Dwight L. Chapin, Nixon's Appointments Secretary, was also convicted of lying to
the grand jury in their investigation of the "dirty tricks" undertaken by Segretti, Chapin, and others
during Nixon's 1972 presidential campaign. See id. at 1277.
14. John Dean, who pleaded guilty to burglary, was Counsel to the President. In that role, his
client could be conceived as the Office of the President and/or the United States government, but
not as Richard Nixon, the individual. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910,
915,922 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that for White House Counsel, the client is "the White House" and
the attorney-client privilege created by these lawyers cannot be asserted by the First Lady in her
personal or professional capacity).
15. See Wasserstrom, supranote 1, at 21-23.
16. Some of the country's most prestigious law firms were implicated in the savings and loan
scandal and were sued by both the government and individuals defrauded by thrift clients for having
assisted their clients in committing fraud or for negligently failing to protect those clients from the
misdeeds of the individuals managing the affairs of those entity clients. See, e.g., In re Am. Cont'l
Corp./Lincoln Say. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424, 1432-33, 1453 (D. Ariz. 1992) (denying
summary judgment motion by Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogne in a case alleging misconduct arising out
of representation of savings and loan controlled by Charles Keating); Susan Beck & Michael Orey,
They Got Ihat They Deserved, AM. LAW., May 1992, at 68, 68 (describing Kaye, Scholer's $41
million settlement with the government arising out of its representation of Lincoln Savings and
Loan).
17. See Milo Geyelin & Ann Davis, Tobacco's Foes Target Role of Lawyers, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 23, 1998, at B1 (reporting that law firms have been named as codefendants with tobacco
companies in several suits alleging a conspiracy to deceive the public about the dangers of tobacco).
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within the bounds of law but outside those bounds. Similarly, all three
situations involved not lawyers dominating individual clients but
lawyers representing entities and deferring altogether too much, not too
little, to dominant individuals acting in the name of those entity-clients."8
To understand any of this conduct, we need different questions. We need
to explore how difficult it is for those trained in law to maintain a belief
in its boundaries. Have modem theories of jurisprudence made the
notion that the law has boundaries harder for lawyers to accept? Or was
it ever thus? As for the lawyer-client relationship, we need to
concentrate more on how that relationship should be structured when the
client is an entity. Are the entities that lawyers represent sufficiently
similar to support one model of the lawyer-entity relationship-the
approach reflected in the ABA Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct 9or are multiple models needed?
Class action abuse is a particularly interesting area in which to
explore both when and why law might fail to affect lawyer conduct and
the complexity of the lawyer-entity relationship. By class action abuse,
we have in mind three related problems: collusive settlements,
inadequate representation of class interests, and payoffs to objectors and
their counsel. The law condemns collusive settlements and the lawyers
who make them.20 It demands that class counsel adequately represent the
class.2' Paying objectors and their counsel to drop their challenges to
class settlements is, at best, legally questionable behavior and, at worst,
evidence of collusion and inadequate representation. = If, as we contend,
these practices have become commonplace, the law has proved a poor
regulator of lawyer conduct. Why?
As to the complexity of the lawyer-entity relationship, class-clients
differ significantly from partnership-clients and corporation-clients, to
name just a few of the possible varieties of entity-clients. For example,
class counsel plays an important, and sometimes exclusive, role in
selecting and controlling the class representatives and shaping the size

18. See, e.g., Am. Cont'l Corp./Lincoln Say. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. at 1450 (noting
that there was insufficient indication that Jones Day had attempted "to ascertain whether their
compliance advice was being heeded").
19. MODEL RuLEs OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2001) [hereinafterMODEL RULES].
20. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 331 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (linking
the notion of collusion with an attorney's intent to defraud or "accomplish an improper purpose"),
vacated, 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), affid sub nom. Amichem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591
(1997).
21. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
22. See infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
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and purpose of the enterprise. 23 By contrast, lawyers representing other
entities typically do not select or control the managing agents, nor do
they define the nature of the firm. Other entities typically have chains of
command, and they have agents authorized to hire and monitor the
entity's lawyers; 4 classes typically have neither.2' With respect to the
scope of the lawyer's representation, the law generally presumes that
corporate counsel represents the corporation and not its officers, 26 but
class counsel necessarily represents both the class and its named
representatives. 2
II. THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAWYERS AND LAW
The traditional approach to legal ethics assumes that the "bounds of
the law" are known and focuses on the fact that these boundaries permit
much undesirable behavior. 28 From this perspective, the moral dilemma
for the lawyer is the conflict between promoting the client's interests
within these known bounds and protecting the interests of society
against client behavior that is lawful, but harmful.29 But the premise
underlying this dilemma is often false. By assuming that lawyers obey
the law and concentrating on what more an ethic should demand of
them, the traditional approach has contributed, however unwittingly, to
the myth that law, unlike moral philosophy, is simple stuff. Even
nonmoralists, such as legal economists, write as if legal rules are fixed in
some meaningful sense, which leads them to focus on problems of overand underdeterrence and to seek "optimal" rules to solve those
problems. 0 Like the moralists, the economists thus view the problem of

23. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER Er AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS
FOR PRIVATE GA 71(2000).
24. MODEL RULES, supra note 19, R. 1.13 cmt. 3.
25. See Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1244, 1450(1981).
26. See MODELRULES, supranote 19, R. 1.13(a), (e).
27. See Developments in the Law, supranote 25, at 1453.
28. See Wasserstrom, supra note 1, at5.
29. See id. at 11.
30. See, e.g., Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Elhauge, Knowledge About Legal Sanctions, 92
MICH. L. REv. 261, 265-66 (1993) (basing their analysis of client ignorance of law on "an optimal
sanctioning regime"). While conceding that "[1]egal sanctions are inevitably imperfect," the authors
nevertheless assert that "behaviorally optimal sanction regimes can, even in theory, achieve no
greater perfection than reaching the optimal trade-off between the underdeterrence of undesirable
behavior and the overdeterrence of desirable behavior." L at 267.
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legal advice as stemming from the fact that lawyers will obey the law,
but nonetheless may be able to give advice that is socially undesirable.3'
Yet to accept, without discussion or qualification, that lawyers
generally obey the law, one must first believe that for lawyers, if not for
everybody, determining what the law demands is relatively easy. One
must further believe that, having identified what the law demands,
lawyers will determine that obedience is the appropriate course of
action. Neither proposition is sustainable. Not only is law more complex
than this account suggests, but the relationship between law and lawyers
is more complex.
Understanding what the law demands may sometimes be a simple
matter: when the light is red, the law demands that you stop. But that is
certainly not always so. Lawyers presumably advised Microsoft that the
way it was responding to its competitors did not violate the antitrust
laws, but the Justice Department's lawyers believed otherwise.32
Whether or not Microsoft's business practices were legal or illegal was
the subject of an intense courtroom battle. There was a final judgment on
the matter,33 but that judgment does not end the difficult questions about
the limits of lawful responses to competitors. It is not that there is no law
on the matter-antitrust law exists-but its contours are not easy to
discern; thus, obedience is no simple task.
Antitrust law is not uniquely uncertain. Uncertainty is inherent in
law, if only because lawmakers cannot identify and address all possible
problems in advance. Thus, the meaning of a legal rule in a particular
situation almost always demands a conscious act of interpretation, the
creation of a story about the rule. Stories connect legal rules to facts, and
in the process give meaning to both the law and the facts. A court
decision, for example, embodies a story that explains what happened;
what the law says should have happened; and whether what happened
diverges enough from what the law demands to constitute an illegal act.
In counseling clients, lawyers must do more than read legal rules;
they must use the stories embodied in court opinions, legislative debates
31. See, e.g., id. at 265-66 (noting that "sanctions will necessarily result in some
overdeterrence of desirable behavior and some underdeterrence of undesirable behavior"); Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and
Social Desirability, 102 HARV. L. REv. 565, 586 n.49 (1989) (noting that not only can desirable
behavior sometimes result in legal liability, but also that "noncompliant" acts may in fact be socially
desirable).
32. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 47 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct.
350 (2001).
33. See id. at 46-47 (affirming, vacating, and remanding in part the district court's judgment
finding that Microsoft violated the Sherman Antitrust Act).
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and executive agency pronouncements to assess their client's proposed
or past conduct. In assessing whether that conduct is legal or illegal, the
lawyer must extrapolate and interpret. After all, the client's conduct will
rarely, if ever, be precisely the same as the conduct that has already been
ruled on by the courts or specifically contemplated by the legislature in
enacting a rule. Thus, the lawyer is required to construct her own storya story about stories told by others. In doing so, the lawyer in a sense
makes law for the client.
To understand the inherent uncertainty of law is to begin to
understand the complexity of the lawyer's relationship to law. Lawyers
are not only trained to understand that the law's boundaries are
uncertain, but they "practice" by constructing stories, thereby helping to
shape the law's boundaries.3 Lawyers are thus a part of, not apart from,
the law's boundaries, a fact of which they are all too well aware from
their legal training and practice.
This knowledge, however, may lull lawyers into a false belief that
law's boundaries either do not exist at all, or do not apply to them. 35 In
particular, lawyers may think that there are no constraints on their
helping clients to do things that the lawyers imagine are lawful, only to
find a court reaching the conclusion that the client's actions were
unlawful and, worse yet, that the lawyers should have realized this based
on existing law. At some level, of course, lawyers know that the law's
limits are real; they affect events. Up close and on a regular basis,
lawyers see damages awarded and fines and prison terms imposed in the
name of those limits. Good lawyers understand that the ethical practice
of law involves lawyers simultaneously shaping legal boundaries ,and
recognizing the real limits to this manipulation. 36 The most significant
ethical dilemma for lawyers is therefore not the one traditionally posed
by legal ethics scholarship, in which lawyers use their knowledge of
certain legal boundaries to assist in legal, though morally questionable,
acts.37 Rather, it is that lawyers sometimes let their awareness of legal

34. See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 476 (1990)
(noting that a lawyer's job often involves challenging legal boundaries at the request of specific
clients).
35. See id, at 483-84 (discussing how the indeterminacy of law, as espoused by legal realism,
renders "the bounds of the law" an ineffective ethical constraint on the lawyer's zealous advocacy).
36. See id. at 514 ("Legal ethics ... must incorporate a form of dialectical tension in which
individual discretion is acknowledged as both necessary and necessary to constrain.").
37. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389,
1395-96 (1992); David B. Wilkins, In Defense of Law and Morality: Why Lawyers Should Have a
Prima Fade Duty To Obey the Law, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269, 293 (1996) ("[S]imple
allegiance to 'law' will sometimes involve the lawyer in immoral conduct.").
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uncertainty delude them into thinking that they have more control over
constructing legal boundaries than they in fact do." In this sense, the
bounds of the law are inextricably intertwined with what lawyers are
allowed to do in shaping those bounds.
The recent savings and loan scandal, in which lawyers were forced
to pay millions in settlements arising out of their representation of
savings and loans that became insolvent, provides a concrete example of
this phenomenon.39 The harsh response of many courts to lawyer conduct
in the scandal represents a collective refusal to allow the fuzziness of the
law governing corporate fraud to become a rationalization for lawyers'
complicity in such fraud. 40 But in many other lawyering contexts-the
class action situation we discuss below being the most notable-courts
have frequently failed to apply the brakes.4'
The problem of legal uncertainty casts doubt on a proposition that
so many legal ethicists take for granted: lawyers simply obey the law.42
Legal uncertainty, however, is only one aspect of the complex
relationship lawyers have with law, including the law governing
lawyers. Not only do lawyers in their role as counselors interpret law for
their clients and themselves, but in their roles as advocates and public
citizens they also occupy a privileged position in the construction of the
legal meaning articulated by courts, and in the construction of the legal
rules to which meaning must be attached.43 In these latter roles, lawyers
act in a very public way to help determine just what the "bounds of the
law" are.
With respect to judge-made law, lawyers are uniquely empowered
by the state to present judges with alternative interpretations of what the
law demands." Most of the time, most judges consider the competing
legal meanings offered by the lawyers in a case and simply adopt one,
albeit generally with some modification, as that court's official
interpretation of the law. 45 Although judges are free to invest law with a
meaning no lawyer advocated or imagined, they rarely do so.46 And even
38. See Wilkins, supra note 34, at 505.
39. See supranote 16 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., In re Am. Cont'l Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424,
1453 (D. Ariz. 1992) (noting that "[c]lient wrongdoing ... cannot negate an attorney's fiduciary
duty" to urge cessation of conduct that entails regulatory violations).
41. See infra notes 122-45 and accompanying text.
42. See Koniak, supra note 37, at 1396.
43. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalismin Non-AdversarialLawyering,
27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 153, 154 (1999); Wilkins, supranote 34, at 471 n.8.
44. See Wilkins, supranote 34, at 483.
45. See id. at 476.
46. See id. at 477.
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when a judge adopts her own interpretation, because lawyers frame the
questions courts decide, the lawyers will still have significantly
influenced the law-building process, a role that extends far beyond a
particular client's casef4
The special role lawyers play in constructing law is not limited to
courtroom practice. Lawyers still dominate legislatures and other
rulemaking bodies. In voluntary organizations, most notably the
American Law Institute, lawyers draft model statutes, which legislatures
often subsequently enact, and purport to codify the common law
developed by judges in Restatements (themselves acts of interpretation
that often go beyond pure restating), which judges often rely on in later
cases. As to the law governing themselves, lawyers in other voluntary
organizations, most notably the American Bar Association, draft model
ethics rules, which almost every jurisdiction in the country has adopted
as law. 9 Although official lawmakers are free to, and often do, modify
or (more rarely) reject these proposed statutes, Restatements, and ethics
rules, lawyers' influence in promulgating these rules, like their influence
50
in courtroom advocacy, is enormous.
The fact that lawyers occupy a privileged position in the
construction of legislative and judicial law complicates lawyers'
obedience to the law in at least two ways. First, lawyers, at least when a
significant number of them act as a group, occupy a privileged position
in constructing new statutes and new interpretations to counter or nullify
existing official law.5 ' Other groups may propose new law; however,
lawyers have a leg up on transforming their proposals into the real thing.
This advantage is particularly troubling when lawyers use their
privileged status to counter extant law directed at their own conduct. For
example, many lawyers were unhappy with court rulings that forced
them to testify before grand juries about matters such as their clients'
fees. 2 In response, various bar groups constructed and sought the
adoption of an ethics rule making it unethical for prosecutors to demand

47. See id.
See, e.g., MODEL CODE OFPROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-8 (1986).
49. See STEPHEN GILLERS & RoY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND
48.

STANDARDS xxiii (2001).
50. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS'

ETHICS

1 (1990)

("[C]ourts increasingly are turning to ethical rules as sources of law.").
51. See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 34, at 471 n.8 (discussing MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-1 (1980)); Wilkins, supra note 37, at 274 (noting that lawyers "have been
given a monopoly by the state to occupy a position of trust, both with ... clients" and within the
"legal framework").
52. See Koniak, supra note 37, at 1398-99.
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such appearances without first obtaining court approval and meeting
other hurdles. 3 Second, lawyers may refuse to play their part in the
construction of official law, encouraging the maintenance of "free
zones" in which the law plays little, if any, role in regulating conduct.'
This path is the one lawyers have taken in the class action area, as we
will discuss shortly. The bar's rhetoric on the right of "self-regulation"
can also be understood in this way, as a call for the state to leave most
lawyer conduct unregulated by law.5
Finally, the lawyer's relationship to law is complicated by the bar's
understanding of its obligation to resist the state on behalf of clients and
in the name of preserving the independence of the bar itself, an
independence that sustains our democracy, at least according to the bar's
ethos.56 If resisting the state is noble, obeying the law may sometimes be
wrong. Ethics opinions and commentary to the ethics rules, both
promulgated by the bar, reflect a strong sense of noble resistance to
official law. For example, a Statement of Policy adopted by the ABA
House of Delegates on the duties to comply with the securities law in
1975 proclaimed:
[A]ny principle of law which, except as permitted or required by the
[Model Code of Professional Responsibility, a code written by the
ABA and not itself official law], permits or obliges a lawyer to
disclose to the [Securities and Exchange Commission] otherwise
confidential information should be established only by statute after full
and careful consideration of the public interests involved and should be
resisted unless clearly mandated by law.
This statement calls on lawyers to resist law embodied in
something other than a clear statutory provision, for example,
administrative regulations and court opinions interpreting the statute,
when that law conflicts with the bar's self-generated rules of conduct.58
In a similar vein, the comment to Model Rule 1.6 of the ABA Model
Rules of ProfessionalConduct states that lawyers "must comply with the
final orders of a court or other tribunal of competent jurisdiction
53. See id. at 1398-1401 (describing the actions taken by the bar); see also id. at 1423-24
(listing other examples of how ethics rules have impacted changes in the law).
54. See id. at 1397.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 1448.
57. House of Delegates Meets in Montreal, 61 A.B.A. J. 1079, 1085-86 (1975) (reprinting the
statement of policy adopted by the House of Delegates "regarding responsibilities and liabilities of
lawyers in advising with respect to the compliance by clients with laws administered by the
Securities and Exchange Commission").
58. See Koniak, supra note 37, at 1483.
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requiring the lawyer to give information about the client."59
Significantly, the rule does not say that a lawyer must comply with
statutes, like the federal tax code, that require lawyers to disclose
material that would otherwise be protected by the bar's ethics rulef ° The
bar's rhetoric of resistance to official law is more than just talk. Many
lawyers have refused to comply with statutes that require disclosure of
material the bar believes lawyers should not be forced to disclose, on the
theory that their acts of resistance fulfill their ethical obligations. 1
Lawyers' skepticism about law's limits, their special role in the
construction of law, and their ethic of noble resistance to law all help to
undermine simplistic assumptions about lawyers living within the
bounds of the law. How lawyers understand law, what it means to obey
law, and when disobedience to law is justified are subjects that have
been pushed off center stage by such simplistic assumptions. Only by
concentrating on the many complexities in the lawyer's relationship to
law can we adequately understand the lawbreaking that pervades the
major lawyer scandals from Watergate to the present, and indeed the
nature of law itself.
ll.

THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE LAWYER-ENTITY RELATIONSHIP

Undoubtedly, much of the work that lawyers do involves the
representation of entities, as opposed to individuals, though quantifying
how much is difficult. The representation of corporations alone
represents a significant percentage of the work of all lawyers, and if one
adds to that all the work lawyers do representing partnerships (and, more
recently, limited liability companies), labor unions, formal and informal
associations, governments and classes, there can be little question that
the representation of entities is at the heart of what many, if not most,
lawyers do. Although the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
59. MODEL RuLES, supra note 19, R. 1.6 cmt. 19.
60. See id. at cmt. 20 (noting that "a presumption should exist against" a "supersession" of
ethics rules by other provisions of law).
61. See, e.g., Koniak, supra note 37, at 1479 (discussing the need to resist the state's
infringement of confidentiality rules); Susan P. Koniak, When Courts Refuse to Frame the Law and
Others Frame It to Their Will, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1075, 1078-79 (1993) (using the example of
Kaye, Scholer's settlement with the government to illustrate the clash between the state and the bar
as regards client confidentiality); David Luban, Legal Ideals and Moral Obligations:A Comment on
Simon, 38 WNM.
& MARY L. REv. 255, 259 (1996) (noting that "lawyers are often better positioned
than nonlawyers to realize the unfairness or unreasonableness of a law" and thus "should be among
the first to violate or nullify it"); William H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law? 38 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 217, 228 (1996) (noting that a "categorical duty of obedience" is "radically
incompatible" with the lawyer's ethic).
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represents an improvement over its predecessor Model Code of
Professional Responsibility in addressing the relationship between
lawyers and their entity-clients, 6 the Model Rules are woefully
inadequate to the complexity of the task at hand.63 Policymakers and
legal ethics scholars have similarly neglected the problems of entity
representation. How does the representation of entity-clients in general
differ from the representation of individual clients? How do entityclients differ from one another? Do the ethics rules adequately deal with
the representation of partnerships, or associations, or classes? These
questions have received too little attention. 6' Our attention has been
diverted to where the ball is not.
The less one's entity-client resembles a large, publicly held
corporation, the less sense the ethics rules make. The only rule
specifically applicable to entity representation, Model Rule 1.13,
addresses a particular crisis in the lawyer's relationship to an entityclient: what a lawyer should do when she discovers that a constituent of
the organization is violating duties to the organization or violating the
law in a manner that might be imputed to the organization.6 In the
62.

Compare MODEL RULES, supra note 19, R. 1.13, with MODEL CODE OF PROF'L

RESPONSIBILrrY EC 5-18 (1982). See also GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 49, at 136 ("There was no

counterpart to [Rule 1.13] in the Disciplinary Rules of the Model Code."); James R. McCall, The
Corporationas Client: Problems, Perspectives,and PartialSolutions, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 623, 627
(1988) ("The Code's discussion of the corporation as client is limited to one paragraph in a
document of over fifty pages").
63. See Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 169,
192-94 (1997).
64. For some recent exceptions, see James M. Fischer, Representing Partnerships: Who
Is/Are the Client(s)? 26 PAC. L.J. 961, 961 (1995); Zacharias, supra note 63, at 171; Frederic L.
Smith, Jr., Student Commentary, Partnership Representation: Finding the Client, 20 J. LEGAL
PROF. 355, 355 (1995-96).
65. See MODEL RULES, supra note 19, R. l.13(b)-(c). The applicable provisions read:
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person
associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a
matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the
organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to the
organization, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer
shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. In
determining how to proceed, the lawyer shall give due consideration to the seriousness
of the violation and its consequences, the scope and nature of the lawyer's
representation, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of the
person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters and any other
relevant considerations. Any measures taken shall be designed to minimize disruption of
the organization and the risk of revealing information relating to the representation to
persons outside the organization. Such measures may include among others:
(1) asking reconsideration of the matter;
(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought for presentation to
the appropriate authority in the organization; and
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representation of large, publicly held corporations this is the crisis: the
rogue manager or, worse yet, the rogue officers or directors. With its
singular focus on this crisis, Rule 1.13 implies that in other situations,
representing an entity is not much different from representing a person
or at least so simple a matter that no particular guidance is required.
When the client is a corporation, this position is at least tenable, because
in the absence of lawless management, it is reasonable for a lawyer to
defer to directions from management or the board just as the lawyer
would defer to directions from an individual client. Such a stance is
consistent with and, indeed vindicates, the corporate form-a form that
presumes that shareholders invest management and the board with the
power to direct corporate activities, and insists that managers and
directors act as faithful fiduciaries in exercising that power.6 The ethics
rule on entity representation presupposes, and depends upon, the checks
and balances that have evolved as a matter of corporate and agency
law. 67 To take an important example, corporate law is fuzziest when the
corporation is on the verge of bankruptcy. With no clear answer in law
on who speaks for the corporation in this situation, Rule 1.13 is of little
use, as lawyers representing failing savings and loans discovered to their
detriment.6 In general, however, the comprehensive legal backdrop
makes it tenable to posit that only when management breaches its
fiduciary duties must the lawyer cease to treat the decisions of managers
as if they were comparable to the decisions of an individual client.
Not all entity-clients are corporations, however. They do not all
share the same central crisis and, when an analogous crisis does present
itself, lawyers for other entity-clients may find that the remedial
measures dictated by Rule 1.13 make little sense, despite the bold
insistence of the rule's comment that the lawyer's duties "apply equally
to unincorporated associations."69

(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if
warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest authority that can
act inbehalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.
(c)If, despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b), the highest authority
that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon action, or a refusal to act, that is
clearly a violation of law and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization,
the lawyer may resign in accordance with Rule 1.16.
Id.
66.
(1985).
67.
68.
69.

See 18A AM. JUR. 2D Corporations§ 732 (1985); 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations§ 1345
See McCall, supranote 62, at 632.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
MODEL RuLES, supranote 19, R. 1.13 cmt. 1.
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Let's start with partnerships. Two of the central crises in the
representation of partnerships involve seemingly analogous situations to
the crisis most likely to occur in corporate representation. When a
majority of the general partners breach fiduciary duties owed the
minority of general partners and when general partners breach fiduciary
duties to limited partners, the lawyer for the partnership is in an
analogous position to that of the corporate lawyer who discovers a
manager engaged in illegal conduct. 70 Rule 1.13, however, provides
much more guidance to the corporate lawyer and is relatively unhelpful
to her partnership-lawyer counterpart. The Rule presumes a formal
hierarchy of control within the entity-client, which the lawyer may use to
help protect the entity from the lawlessness of its agents. 7' In plain
language, the Rule tells a lawyer to make her way up the entity's chain
of command, bringing the misconduct to ever-higher levels of authority
in an effort to bring the lawless agent into line. When general partners
act in breach of fiduciary duties to limited partners or to a minority of
their peers, to whom should the lawyer appeal? The partnership lawyer
is likely to begin at the place Rule 1.13 marks as an end: advising the
highest authority designated to act on behalf of the entity-typically all
general partners-to abide by the law, and in all likelihood meeting
resistance.
Many scholars criticized Rule 1.13, as adopted by the ABA, for
prohibiting corporate lawyers from speaking out to the government or
shareholders in the event that the corporation's highest authority, the
board, refused to act in accordance with law.72 Rule 1.13's resolution of
the "lawless board" problem is that the corporate lawyer should resign
and remain quiet about the violation of law.73 Whether this resolution
strikes the right balance is subject to debate, if for no other reason than
the fact that following it may leave lawyers vulnerable to liability. 74 The
70. But see Fischer, supra note 64, at 967-69 (discussing the difficulties posed by extending
rules applicable to the corporate structure to situations involving partnerships).
71. See MODEL RULES, supranote 19, R. 1.13 cmt. 3.
72. See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, Model Rule 1.13(c) Gives the Wrong Answer to the Question of
CorporateCounsel Disclosure, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 289, 304 (1987); McCall, supranote 62, at
637-38.
73. See MODEL RULES, supra note 19, R. 1.13(c); George H. Brown, FinancialInstitution
Lawyers as Quasi-PublicEnforcers, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 637, 661 (1994); Gillers, supra note
72, at 304-05; McCall, supranote 62, at 637.
74. See, e.g., H. Lowell Brown, The Dilemma of Corporate Counsel Faced with Client
Misconduct: Disclosure of Client Confidences or Constructive Discharge, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 777,
777 (1996) (noting that a lawyer's silence in face of client wrongdoing is increasingly resulting in
personal liability); Stanley Pietrusiak, Jr., Comment, Changing the Nature of Corporate
Representation: Attorney Liabilityfor Aiding and Abetting the Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 28 ST.
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Rule requires a lawyer to leave her vulnerable client, the corporation,
and that client's most vulnerable constituents, the shareholders, at the
mercy of unfaithful agents." The power of this objection, however, is
significantly muted as long as one assumes that in almost all cases the
corporation's highest authority will comply with the lawyer's advice.
Thus, as long as the corporation's central crisis takes place below board
level, it is reasonable to require lawyers to work their way up the chain
of command. The partnership's analogous crises, however, are much
more likely to involve misconduct at the top, 76 and, as a consequence,
Rule 1.13 adds little to the general rule requiring all lawyers to resign if
necessary to avoid assisting a client in unlawful conduct.77
More troublesome, the crises central to the representation of other
entity-clients, like classes, are simply not analogous to those that plague
corporations. In class actions, the big problem is not that those
designated to represent the class as typical plaintiffs or defendants (the
named representatives) are likely to act lawlessly and thereby harm the
class; the problem is that class lawyers will subordinate the class's
interest to their own.8 In fact, the class is entirely a creation of the
lawyer: class counsel control its beginning, its end, its shape, and its
conduct. 7 Rule 1.13 assumes that a well-defined entity exists with a
hierarchical structure protected by legal checks and balances, and that an
agent other than the lawyer is available to monitor the lawyer and direct
the lawyer's effort.80 The Rule, therefore, simply does not speak to the
problem of lawyer domination of the entity-client, which is at the core of
all the difficult situations that confront class counsel.
Class actions are merely an extreme example of a more general
point about the lawyer-entity relationship. That relationship depends on
the law that structures or fails to structure the entity-client. The more
that internal and external rules structure an entity, for example, by
designating the agents authorized to speak, listen, and act on behalf of
that entity, the easier it is for lawyers, authors of ethics rules,
commentators, and courts to conceptualize how lawyers should act in
MARY'S L.J. 213, 216-18 (1996) (discussing how liability may be imposed on attorneys even where
no law has been violated). But see Brown, supra note 73, at 661 (arguing that "[i]f avoiding
malpractice liability ... is the lawyer's goal, then the lawyer's best bet is probably to remain silent
in the face of management's violations of law, and withdraw from the representation if necessary").
75. See McCall, supra note 62, at 638.
76. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
77. See MODEL RULEs, supra note 19, R. 1.16(a).
78. See HENSLER Er AL., supra note 23, at 79.
79. See id. at 74-75.
80. See MODEL RULES, supra note 19, R. 1.13(b)(3) & cmt. 3.
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representing those entities, and to envision and address the crises likely
to plague particular entities. On the other hand, the more formless the
entity-the less defined it is by internal or external law-the more
difficult it is to speak coherently about what lawyers should and should
not do. In this regard, it is at least interesting, if not disturbing, that
following the savings and loan crisis-and at least in part because of
it-we have seen the blossoming of a dizzying array of new limitedliability business entities,81 which create whole new areas of legal
uncertainty in entity representation. This uncertainty exists not only
because the statutes governing these entities are so new and
unexplored,82 but also because the entities themselves are hybrids of
partnerships and corporations, raising questions of how courts will
interpret the rules applicable to them.
Thus, to some extent the two neglected questions in professional
responsibility are related. The question of how lawyers should deal with
their entity-clients is a question that requires not simply philosophical
musings, but legal analysis and theoretical and empirical inquiry into the
lawyer's relationship to the law, in particular the law-both old and
new-governing entity-clients, as well as the law governing lawyers.
That is the lesson we should have learned from previous lawyer
scandals. It is the lesson we might learn now from the disgrace that class
action practice has become. We turn to that subject now.

81. The new business forms are limited liability companies ("LLCs"), limited liability
partnerships ("LLPs"), and limited liability limited partnerships ("LLLPs"). All states have adopted
statutes permitting the creation of LLCs and LLPs. See J. DENNIS HYNES, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP,
AND THE LLC: IN A NUTSHELL 7-8 (2d ed. 2001). Law firms themselves have increasingly begun to
use limited liability entities to protect their members, raising some of the questions of lawyers'
advantage in constructing law that were raised supra notes 43-55 and accompanying text. See
Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships:Presentat the Birth (Nearly), 66 U.
COLO. L. REv. 1065, 1069 (1995) (arguing that the LLP came about as a response to huge damages
awards against accounting and law partnerships stemming from the savings and loan crisis, among
other events); see also Martin C. McWilliams, Jr., Limited Liability Law Practice,49 S.C. L. REv.
359, 359 (1998) (noting the link between increased lawyer liability and the rise of LLPs and LLCs);
Michael J. Lawrence, Note, The FortifiedLaw Firm: Limited Liability Business and the Proprietyof
Lawyer Incorporation,9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 207, 207 (1995) (discussing how attorneys were
able to persuade state legislatures to adopt laws permitting LLPs in the wake of the savings and loan
crisis).
82. See Hamilton, supranote 81, at 1081-84 (discussing some of the legal problems posed by
the LLP structure and noting that it "may affect allocations of partnership interests and ... decisions
in unpredictable ways").
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IV.

CLASS ACTION ABUSE

The world of class action practice we see is one in which abuse
flourishes.83 It is a world in which lawyers make fabulous fees for
achieving very little, if anything, on behalf of their clients; defendantcorporations make sweetheart deals to dispose of serious liability at
bargain-basement rates; and absent class members end up with useless
coupons or pennies on the dollar as compensation for their alleged
injuries. ' While we believe abuse is rampant, others believe it is
relatively rare: the exception, not the rule." There is no way to establish
to a certainty which belief more accurately reflects the current state of
class actions. There is no common definition of abuse. Many, although
no one knows how many, court opinions in class action cases are not
published 6 In those cases in which detailed court opinions are available,
information critical to the determination of whether the settlement is
abusive may not appear on the surface of the opinion, and the underlying
record is likely to be either unavailable, skimpy, or, at the other extreme,
too voluminous to make an assessment of many cases a practical
undertaking." Despite these difficulties, we need to begin by setting out
the reasons for our conviction that abuse in class actions is pervasive.
We have two: the incentives built into the present system, and available
empirical and anecdotal evidence.
The incentives built into the current class action system suggest that
abuse is pervasive.88 "All lawyer-client relationships create [conflicts]
because the interests of lawyers and clients are not perfectly aligned[,]" a
situation economists call an "agency problem[]." 9 Lawyers have a keen
interest in the size of their fees, while "[c]lients are interested primarily
in the size of their recovery."' To the degree lawyers dominate the
lawyer-client relationship, there is a danger that they will "engage in
conduct that increases their fees ...at the expense of the client's
recovery."'" Class actions exacerbate agency problems considerably.92

83. See Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REv.

1051, 1055-56 (1996). Much of the following discussion draws from this article.
84. See id.
at 1053-54.
85. See id.
at 1054-55.
86. See id. at 1081-83.

87. See id.
88. See id. at 1103.
89. Id.

90. Id.
91. Id. at 1103-04.
92. See id. at 1104.
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In ordinary lawyer-client relationships, clients can deal with the
agency problem in two ways: by a contract between the lawyer and
client that limits the lawyer's fee or ties it to the client's recovery, or by
monitoring the lawyer's performance carefully as the representation
proceeds. 93 These solutions, imperfect enough in the ordinary client
setting (especially when clients are unsophisticated individuals), are
even more ineffective in the class action setting: "The reason is that
absent class members, by definition the majority of the class, neither
contract with the lawyer, nor ... monitor the lawyers' actions." 94 Class
representatives, chosen and controlled by class counsel, are in no
position to make restrictive fee contracts with class counsel." Nor have
courts in general insisted that the class representatives be consulted
about the progress of the suit.96 Indeed, they regularly approve class
settlements even though the class representative has only the vaguest
idea of what the settlement provides. 97 Thus, client monitoring of lawyer
performance is effectively unavailable in almost all class actions.
Defendants and their lawyers in class action suits understand the
agency problem just discussed and have every incentive to exploit it. 9'
Defendants have a strong interest in minimizing their liability exposure
through a settlement.9 They "care only about the total amount they must
pay out in settlement, not how the payoff is distributed between class
members and the class lawyer."' u Thus, defendants have a strong
incentive to offer class counsel a deal in which the defendants accede to
increased class counsel fees in return for the class counsel's agreeing to
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 1112. In fact, some class actions are so far beyond the comprehension and
control of clients that they border on unconscionable. See id. at 1078-80; see also HENSLER ElTAL.,
supra note 23, at 80 (noting that in some class actions, "there are ... no real clients to make
demands").
96. See Koniak & Cohen, supra note 83, at 1104 n.176.
97. See, e.g., Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding representation to be
adequate despite the fact that class representative "displayed a complete ignorance of facts
concerning the transaction that he was challenging"); Eggleston v. Chi. Journeymen Plumbers'
Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d 890, 896 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating that the class representative's role
is limited, and citing Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966), for the proposition that
it is not sufficient to defeat class certification where the named plaintiff did not understand the
complaint or the nature of the lawsuit); J/H Real Estate, Inc. v. Abramson, No. 95-4176, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1546, at *7 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 1996) ("[C]lass counsel, not the class representative,
guide and orchestrate the litigation."); Heastie v. Cmty. Bank of Greater Peoria, 125 F.R.D. 669,
676-77 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (accepting as adequate a named plaintiff who was unfamiliar with the
details of the claim).
98. See Koniak & Cohen, supra note 83, at 1111-12.
99. Seeid.atllll.
100. Id.
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a lower recovery for class members. There is every reason to believe that
many class action settlements involve the trade of a smaller recovery pie
for a larger fee slice.' ' We call this a collusive deal.
Of course, honorable class counsel could try to resist the collusive
settlement offers of defendants and their lawyers.3 But if class counsel
"balk at the prospect of selling out their clients," the defendant can try
auctioning off the right to bargain on behalf of the class to lawyers more
willing to cooperate' 0 3 The fact that defendants have effective control
over which lawyers represent the class may seem surprising. Defendants
get that control because they have a very important bargaining chip: the
ability to challenge class certification."' In most mass tort cases, the
defendant's agreement not to fight class certification is crucial, because
the heterogeneity of the class would prevent certification if the defendant
decided to challenge it.'0 5 Even in class suits not involving mass torts, the
threat to challenge certification and impose high costs on uncooperative
class counsel gives defendants great leverage.' A lawyer who wages an
expensive fight to get a class certified for trial and loses gets no fees. °7
The collusion between class counsel and defendants can and does
take a variety of forms. One strategy is to make the class as big and
undivided as possible, which means bigger fees for class counsel, greater
finality for defendants, and fewer competing plaintiffs' lawyers to muck
things up.' This strategy can disadvantage some members of the
class-for example, those few with relatively strong claims relative to
others. But dividing the class into subgroups of people, known as
subclasses, is not in the interest of class counsel or defendants.' 9
Another strategy is to find methods to lock class members into
settlements, thereby defeating the ordinary right of absent class members

101. Seeid.atllll-12.
102. Seeid.at ll3.
103. See id.; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 95 CoLuM. L. REV. 1343, 1354 (1995).
104. See Koniak & Cohen, supranote 83, at 1113.
105. Seeid. at1ll3n.204.
106. See id. at 1113.
107. See Robert B. Gerard & Scott A. Johnson, The Role of the Objector in Class Action
Settlements-A Case Study of the GeneralMotors Truck "Side Saddle" Fuel Tank Litigation, 31
LOY. L.A. L. REv. 409,416 (1998); Koniak & Cohen, supra note 83, at 1114.
108. See Coffee, supra note 103, at 1350 n.21 (citing Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141
(S.D. Ohio 1992), appeal dismissed, 995 F.2d 1066 (6th Cir. 1993), a class action involving a
defective heart valve where defendants insisted the class be extended from nationwide to global).
109. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 741-45 (2d Cir. 1992)
(discussing the need for and complexities of dividing a class into subclasses, specifically in the
context of an insolvent defendant), modified sub nom. In re Findley, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993).
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to "opt out."" Transforming opt-out classes into non-opt-out classes is
another way of ensuring as much finality as possible for defendants.'
The collusion here can take one of two forms. First, the defendant can
get class counsel to tack a request for an injunction onto a class
complaint for money damages.' 2 When a class action is brought to ask
for an injunction to help the whole class, the rule does not give class
members the right to opt out."' The defendant tells the class lawyer that
the defendant would settle the class's claims for money damages on the
condition that class counsel include a request for a makeweight
injunction-for example, one ordering the defendant to put up a plaque
to commemorate those who died as a result of the defendant's product.
That ensures that no one in the class can refuse to accept what the class
settlement offered4 her in money damages (or coupons) and elect to sue
as an individual."

The second method that has been developed to lock in the class is
for the defendant and class counsel to agree to tell the court that the
defendant's assets should be treated as if they were too small to pay all
class members." 5 Class action law allows the locking in of class
members when there is a designated pot of money from which all claims
must be paid and that pot is too small to pay everyone in the class all
that they might be owed." 6 It follows that, if the defendant and compliant

class lawyers are free to designate the available pot of money, they can
always designate an amount that is too small, which means they can
always lock in all class members.

110. See Coffee, supra note 103, at 1382.
111. See id.
112. Injunctions are court orders directing a party to do or stop doing something. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 788 (7th ed. 1999).
113. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(2); see also Coffee, supra note 103, at 1427. The lack of an optout right for a (b)(2) class is based on the notion that the injunction will necessarily affect all
members of the class. Therefore, all members should be included in the suit to ensure that the
interests of all will be taken into account in issuing and framing the injunction or in denying it. See
id.; see also id. at 1411-12 (describing how such a tactic was used in Hayden v. Atochem N. Am.,
Inc., No. H-92-1054 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 10, 1995) (notice of pendency of class action)).
114. See Coffee, supranote 103, at 1382.
115. See id. at 1403 (describing a situation where defendant succeeded in limiting its pool of
assets to insurance proceeds, thereby "contribut[ing] only a trivial proportion of its own assets to the
settlement fund"). Bankruptcy is also used as a way to limit funds accessible to class action suits.
See id. at 1409-10 (describing the strategy used by Dow Coming in In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-I0000-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at *17 (N.D.
Ala. Sept. 1, 1994).
116. See Coffee, supranote 103, at 1410 ("Used together, the combination of bankruptcy and a
class action effectively convert[s) a standard Rule 23(b)(3) opt out class action into a de facto
mandatory class action.").
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Recognizing this problem, the United States Supreme Court, in
Ortiz v. FibreboardCorp.,"7 reversed a district court's approval of a
class action settlement, which had been upheld by the Fifth Circuit, in
which this collusive technique was used." 8 The Court rejected the
settlement in part because the only evidence that the pot of moneymostly insurance money-was insufficient was the settlement agreement
between the defendant and class counsel, and an accompanying
settlement between the defendant and its liability insurance companies." 9
It is too soon to tell, however, whether Ortiz will succeed in killing off
this collusive technique or whether class action participants will succeed
in finding effective substitutes.""
Courts in class actions are supposed to thwart collusive efforts, as
the Supreme Court did in Ortiz, by fulfilling the monitoring role that the
client cannot.' 2' Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires district court approval of class action settlements:'
117. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
118. See id. at 828-30.
119. See id. at 848. The Court held that "in an action such as this the settling parties must
present not only their agreement, but evidence on which the district court may ascertain the limit
and the insufficiency of the fund, with support in findings of fact following a proceeding in which
the evidence is subject to challenge." Id. at 849; see also id. at 864 (stating that, assuming the Court
would allow such a settlement at all, "it would be essential that the fund be shown to be limited
independently of the agreement of the parties to the action").
120. Despite its broad statements that the class settlement agreement could not establish a
limited fund, the Court's opinion contains language that appears not to rule out the possibility
completely. In Ortiz, the alleged "limited fund" consisted mostly of insurance policies with no
aggregate limits on their face, but whose applicability to the class' claims was being sharply
contested by the insurance companies in pending state court litigation. See id. at 850-5 1. Because of
the uncertain outcome of the insurance coverage litigation, the class counsel and defendant had
argued that the value of the insurance policies was not unlimited, but a discounted "settlement
value." Id at 851. The Court stated that the settlement value of insurance policies might be
sufficient to establish that a limited pot of money existed, but found such a position acceptable only:
if one can assume that parties of equal knowledge and negotiating skill agreed upon the
figure through arms-length bargaining, unhindered by any considerations tugging against
the interests of the parties ostensibly represented in the negotiation. But no such
assumption may be indulged in this case, or probably in any class action settlement with
the potential for gigantic fees.
Id. at 852 (emphasis added). The Court found that class counsels' agreement to the insurance
settlement value was inherently suspect because they had a conflict of interest: they had separately
settled claims of their individual clients at the same time as, and contingent on, the class action
settlement, and so had a great incentive to agree to any settlement that could win court approval. See
id, This language implies that it remains an open question what the Court would do if class counsel
did not suffer from such a severe conflict.
121. See Koniak & Cohen, supra note 83, at 1104; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:Economic Analysis and
Recommendationsfor Reform, 58 U. CH. L. REv. 1, 45 (1991).
122. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
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Ostensibly, the court stands in for the client as a fiduciary to ensure
that the settlement is fair to the client and does not merely serve the
lawyer's interest. But this arrangement simply replaces one imperfect
agent (class counsel) with another (the court). Although the court has
no monetary interest in the settlement, its interests are not perfectly
aligned with the interests of class members.'23
Courts generally favor settlements because they clear crowded dockets.
The alternatives-trying the class action or, worse yet, trying the
multitude of suits that make up the class action individually-are
particularly burdensome, taking up significant court time and
resources.'24 Judge Henry Friendly observed that "[a]ll the dynamics
conduce to judicial approval of [the] settlement[]" once the adversaries
have agreed.-' Although the case law may require full and elaborate
judicial review before a settlement is approved, it is doubtful that courts
have much incentive to be very demanding. Their deferential attitude is
probably best expressed by one recent decision which acknowledged
that "[i]n deciding whether to approve [a] settlement proposal, the court
starts from the familiar axiom that a bad settlement is almost always
better than a good trial. 1 26 Even if courts did not face these incentives,
they may lack the information necessary to make an informed evaluation
of the settlement.' 27 Moreover, the court's institutional role as neutral
arbiter limits its ability to serve as an effective fiduciary.'2 Courts are
not and cannot be advocates for the class.129 Although courts provide
some constraint on collusive behavior, for the reasons just given it is
predictable that courts would be generally unreliable monitors of class
counsel's performance and ineffective protectors of class members'
interests, and that they will resist the broader implications of cases like
Ortiz.

123. Koniak & Cohen, supranote 83, at 1122.
124. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 714 n.121 (1986); Macey & Miller, supra note 121, at 45-46; Sylvia R.
Lazos, Note, Abuse in PlaintiffClassAction Settlements: The Need for a GuardianDuring Pretrial
Settlement Negotiations, 84 MICH. L. REV. 308, 308 nn.1-2 (1985).
125. Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dissenting),
aff'd en banc by equally divided court, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 28
(1966).
126. In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affid,
798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986).
127. See Coffee, supra note 124, at 714 n.121; Macey & Miller, supranote 121, at 46.
128. See Koniak & Cohen, supra note 83, at 1127.
129. See id.
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Judges do have "an interest in promoting their reputation for
fairness," which at least "should encourage them to safeguard the
interests of absent class members."'30 However, individual judges are
unlikely to suffer negative reputational effects among the general public
from approving bad class deals. The press and academia have imperfect
access to class settlements, and even when settlement documents are
readily accessible, they are likely to be so complex that sorting out what
happened is very difficult. 3'
Class settlements are, if nothing else, heavily lawyered affairs, and
discerning fraud through reams of legalese drafted to conceal any such
activity requires effort few reporters ... and few academics have thus
far made. To the extent the general public, media or academics blame
anyone for the abuse they perceive, albeit find difficult to document,
that blame tends to land on the doorstep of lawyers, not the

judiciary.... And... judges understand all of this

....

1

More important, courts worry not only about their reputation
among the general public, but also about their reputation among other
judges and lawyers. 33 Rejecting a settlement that clears not only one's
own docket but the dockets of colleagues is not apt to win a judge the
praise of fellow judges. Nor should a judge expect to win praise from the
bar for rejecting the efforts of lawyers and firms." The judge who has to
work with these lawyers on a continual basis would be understandably
reluctant to reject a settlement on the grounds that those lawyers
colluded. Moreover, state judges who must stand for election may
depend on lawyers for campaign contributions, and all judges, whether
elected or appointed, may depend on the bar for endorsements.'3 1 Judges
may be wary of academic criticism, but this has far less practical impact.
Indeed, academic criticism can be-and often is in the class action area
dismissed as idealistic musing by people not sufficiently grounded in the
"real world."' 36 More important, many legal academics are hesitant to
130. Id. at 1125.
131. See id. at 1125-26; see also id. at 1057-68 (describing a particularly egregious class action
settlement that received notoriety because one of the authors of the article figured out what had
gone on by going through all of the court documents, and then notified the press).
132. Id. at 1126.
133. See id. at 1127.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 1127 n.237.
136. See David R. Barnhizer, Prophets, Priests, and Power Blockers: Three Fundamental
Roles of Judges and Legal Scholars in America, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 127, 183-84 (1988) (discussing
Francis Bacon's conclusion that judges most often seek "useful" knowledge and "it is generally
necessary to confine judicial thinking to ... 'immediate causes"'); see also Kenneth F. Ripple,
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criticize at least federal judges, perhaps because they hope someday to
join their ranks, or for whatever reason. Legal academics have also
developed something of a stake in the class action system by, for
example, serving as special masters in
37 evaluating settlements, who get
paid only if a settlement is approved.
It is possible that trial courts' enthusiasm for settlement could be
tempered by the possibility of reversal on appeal in cases like Ortiz.
Appellate judges, "one step removed from the mess," presumably have
less interest in approving every class settlement that comes up on
appeal. 38 "But being one step removed also means that appellate judges
are to a large extent necessarily dependent on the findings of the trial
judge as to the fairness of the terms, the adequacy of the representation
and the appropriateness of the request for attorney's fees."' 39 That
distance explains why appellate courts review such matters under the
abuse of discretion standard, 40 which seems appropriate but which also
will never lead to a high rejection rate. 4' Cases like Ortiz may simply
demonstrate that appellate courts are able to act only when the facts are
egregious and apparent. If, in response to Ortiz, district courts acquiesce
in the papering over of difficulties, appellate courts may not be in a good
position to do anything about it.
The available empirical evidence supports the claim that courts are
extremely reluctant to reject proposed class action settlements. A recent
empirical study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center of class action
practice in four federal district courts finds that of the 117 proposed class
action settlements, around 90% were approved without changes. 42 The
Judges on Judging: The Judge and the Academic Community, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1237, 1237 (1989)
(quoting a member of the Judicial Committee of the British House of Lords as saying, "we believe
there is very little room for philosopher kings in our legal system").
137. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the
Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1163 (1995) (describing a typical mass tort class
action as including "a local law professor of national reputation who has served as a 'special master'
to assist the judge in evaluating the formulas of settlement").
138. Koniak & Cohen, supranote 83, at 1124.
139. Id.; see also Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 34 (3d Cir. 1971)
(noting that "[g]reat weight" is to be given to the trial judge's opinion "because he is exposed to the
litigants, and their strategies, positions and proofs").
140. See Ace Heating, 453 F.2d at 34; JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 13.4, at 608 (2d ed. 1993) (noting that "any rulings that are within the discretion of the trial judge
will be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard"). Abuse of discretion is the most deferential
standard of review available.
141. See Koniak & Cohen, supranote 83, at 1124.
142. See THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 58
(1996).
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percentage of approved settlements jumps to 98% if one includes
settlements in which the judge conditioned approval on some change,
however minor.143 As for attorneys' fees, although the study found that
objections were made in 21 (18%) of the cases, in 19 of those cases the
court awarded the full fee requested.' 44 Thus, not only are proposed
settlements routinely approved without change, but so are the proposed
attorneys' fees. Of the settlements approved in the study, only three were
appealed, and only one4 of those three-the only appeal filed by
objectors-was reversed. 1
Moreover, if judges had no bias in favor of accepting class
settlements and the standard on appeal were much more stringent, it is
reasonable to believe that the vast majority of class settlements would
still be approved no matter how dirty the conduct was that surrounded
the settlement. The reason: most hearings on the fairness of class
settlements are not adversarial proceedings.' 46 The Federal Judicial
Center study found that in the four districts studied 42% to 64% of the
fairness hearings were concluded without any presentation of objections
to the proposed settlement by "class members and other objectors.' 47
The study provides no information on whether, in the cases where
objectors made written objections or appeared at the hearing, they were
represented by counsel or appeared pro se, but it is probably safe to
assume that many of those objections were raised pro se. 141 In the
absence of a trained advocate to present problems with a proposed
settlement, the likelihood that a judge could ferret out corruption or

143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 191 tbl.51, 193 tbl.53. The settlement reversed on appeal-based on improper
certification of class and abuse of discretion by the lower court in determining that the settlement
was fair and adequate-was In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products
Liability Litigation, 55 F.3d 768, 779 (3d. Cir. 1995). With respect to attorneys' fees, ten appeals
were filed, including in the GeneralMotors case. See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 142, at 77. Of
the other nine appeals, two courts affirmed the fee award, two courts dismissed the appeal, one court
reversed a denial of fees, one court reversed a trial court's reduction of fees, one court remanded for
reconsideration, and two other appeals were pending at the time of the study. See id. at 77, 191-94
tbls.51-54.
146. See HENSLER Er AL., supra note 23, at 88 ("The judge's ability to assess the value of the
settlement is constrained because a case that settles before trial has, by definition, not been the
subject of a full-fledged, comprehensive evidentiary hearing involving fact and expert witnesses,
cross-examination, and documentary evidence.").
147. WtLLGING Er AL., supranote 142, at 57; see also id. at 178 tbl.38.
148. See, e.g., id. at 57 (noting that "filing written objections to the settlement was far more
frequent than... appearing at the settlement hearing").
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illegality surrounding a settlement that is presented jointly by class
counsel and defendant's counsel as fair, legal, and just is quite small. 4 9
The current system provides little incentive for lawyers to seek out
corruption or illegality in proposed settlements. Objecting lawyers stand
little chance of receiving fees or even reimbursement of expenses
incurred in mounting a challenge. 50 When a court rejects a settlement,
there is by definition no common fund from which to award attorneys'
fees to objecting counsel.15' To award counsel fees to objecting counsel
who exposed a settlement as the product of collusion and thus unworthy
of approval would require the courts to find some other source of funds52
from which to pay those fees. Thus far, no court has taken that step.
Lawyers are sometimes motivated to challenge proposed settlements in
149. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. A proposed revision to Rule 23(e) which
would authorize judges to refer settlement proposals to magistrate judges or special masters for
independent evaluation would not solve this problem. Neither a judge nor a special master is an
advocate. Thus, the proposed rule change would simply replicate the "judge" problem at a different
level.
150. In the Federal Judicial Center study, the researchers found "no fee awards to, and few fee
requests by, counsel other than plaintiffs' counsel." WILLGING Er AL., supra note 142, at 68. We
have found no case in which a court has awarded attorneys' fees to objecting counsel for raising
arguments that caused the court to disapprove a class action settlement. In approving a settlement,
courts sometimes award fees to objectors upon a finding that the objectors conferred a monetary
benefit upon the class by raising objections that resulted in the court modifying some part of the
settlement (usually class counsel's request for attorneys' fees). See Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace
Motor Freight Inc., 9 F.3d 849, 855 (10th Cir. 1993) (awarding fees to objecting counsel because
the court found that the objection was valid and conferred a net benefit on the class); Ace Heating &
Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 35 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding that an objecting attorney
should not be denied reasonable compensation for a benefit conferred on the class); Bowling v.
Pfizer, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1261, 1285 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (awarding attorneys' fees to objectors for
their role in improving the settlement for the class); 1 ALBA CONTE, ATrORNEY FEE AWARDS
§ 2.25, at 91-92 (2d ed. 1993). But see Grunin v. Int'l House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 126-27 (8th
Cir. 1975) (denying objector fees); Alpine Pharmacy, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 481 F.2d 1045,
1053-54 (2d Cir. 1973) (denying objector fees); Milstein v. Werner, 58 F.R.D. 544, 552 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (denying objector fees); Newman v. Stein, 58 F.R.D. 540, 543-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (denying
fees to settlement objectors who conferred no class benefit).
151. See WILLGING ET AL., supranote 142, at 69 & n.249 (noting that courts award attorneys
fees under the common-fund doctrine, which holds that a person cannot benefit from a lawsuit
without contributing to its costs); see also Milstein, 58 F.R.D. at 552 (noting that an objector cannot
be paid except where the objector has helped to create the fund from which to draw payment).
152. A possible way to calculate such objectors' attorneys' fees might be the lodestar method,
"under which the fee award is calculated by multiplying the hours reasonably expended times the
reasonable hourly rates." WILLGING ET AL., supranote 142, at 70; see also id. at 69-71 (contrasting
the common fund doctrine with the lodestar method). However, in recent years, courts have moved
away from using the lodestar method even for attorneys who have conferred a benefit on the class.
See id. "The Supreme Court never formally adopted the lodestar method in a common fund case,"
id. at 70 n.251, and at least one Circuit Court of Appeals-the Eleventh-has held that attorneys'
fees must be paid from the fund established for the benefit of the class, see id. at 70 n.255 (quoting
Camden I Condo. Ass'n v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768,774 (11 th Cir. 1991)).
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the hope of reaping some later economic benefit, such as success in
one's own bid to be class counsel in a later suit or continued income
from individual suits, which would be more lucrative than processing
people through a claims procedure set up for class members under a
proposed settlement. However, because the chances of convincing a trial
judge to reject a settlement are so slim, and the chances on appeal are
not much greater and entail added expenses, the expected benefit of
derailing the settlement would have to be enormous to make it rational
to launch a serious challenge. 53 Even when objectors and their lawyers
have sufficient incentive and funding to challenge the class settlement,
however, they are often motivated not by the chance to protect the class
from a sellout settlement but by the prospect of being paid off by class
counsel and/or the defendant to drop their objections and walk away."
The situation is thus ripe for abuse. It is in the interest of all the
participants in the class action-save the absent members of the classto settle class actions by collusively transferring money from the class to
class counsel.5 5 As long as some plaintiffs' lawyers are willing to act in
a self-interested way, they will be rewarded by defendants with
extraordinary fees funded at the expense of the class. 5 6 Courts will not
effectively monitor the abuse because of their interest in seeing cases
settled.'57 Because abuse-by which we mean fraud and negligence as to
the class's interest-is in the interest of the participants, it is reasonable
to expect abuse to be pervasive. Combined with our experience and the
available evidence of class action practice, our understanding of the
incentives built into the present system sustains our conviction that
collusion and inadequate representation are everyday features of the
class action world-a scandalous state of affairs.

153. It happens. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 617 (3d Cir. 1996),
vacating 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994), aff'd sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591 (1997). However, the economics suggest that it will happen rarely.
154. For examples of cases in which objecting counsel switched sides to become cooperating
class counsel or mysteriously disappeared, see Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1261, 1265,
1271-73 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (noting that most of the objecting lawyers subsequently became Special
Counsel for the class and requested attorneys' fees); Price v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., No. 94-0647-B-S,
slip op. at 45 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 3, 1995) (noting that all objecting counsel ultimately dropped their
objections following minor changes to the settlement).
155. See supranotes 98-109 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
157. See supranotes 121-37 and accompany text.
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V. No THERE, THERE
If we are correct that collusion and inadequate representation are
rampant in class actions, what does that say about Wasserstrom's two
questions and our refraining of them?15 s Let's start with the "bounds of
the law" of class actions. That law condemns both collusion and
inadequate representation; at least that's what the court opinions say. 5 9
"IT]he proponents [of a proposed class action settlement] have the
burden of proving that ... the settlement is not collusive but was

reached after arm's length negotiations."' '60 The court is supposed to
reject the settlement if that burden is not met.' 6' And the absence of
collusion is not enough: Again, according to the law that courts purport
to be applying, no class settlement may be approved unless the court
finds that the class has been afforded adequate representation by
counsel.'62 The courts have interpreted the Constitution's Due Process
Clause to guarantee the class adequate representation by the named
plaintiffs and by counsel.'63 Moreover, the guarantee is so important that
the initial court's determination of this issue may be reexamined not just
on appeal but even after all appeals have been exhausted.' 4 In other
words, an absent class member may sue the defendant at some later
point in time and claim that the class settlement should be treated as a
legal nullity because, despite what the trial and appellate courts ruling on
the settlement said, the lawyers who proposed the settlement did not
adequately represent the class. While recently some academic
commentators have argued strenuously against this two-bites-at-the-

158. See supranotes 1-5 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d
768, 801 (3d. Cir. 1995) (noting the "special need" to assure that settlement classes are adequately
represented); Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 331 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (defining
collusion as an agreement "to defraud a person of his rights by the forms of law"), vacated, 83 F.3d
610 (3d Cir. 1996), aff'd sub nom. Aichem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
160. See Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. Unisys Corp., 858 F. Supp. 1243, 1264 (E.D.N.Y.
1994).
161. See id.
162. See, e.g., General Motors, 55 F.3d at 800 (holding that the adequacy of representation
requirement of FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) has two components: whether named plaintiff's interests are
aligned with absent members, and whether counsel is qualified to represent the class).
163. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985); Hansberry v. Lee, 311
U.S. 32,42-43 (1940).
164. See, e.g., Guthrie v. Evans, 815 F.2d 626, 628 (11th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that "under
circumstances of inadequate representation," class members may pursue relief in a collateral
proceeding); Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 75 (5th Cir. 1973) (noting that the class is bound by
the effects of res judicata "unless the party attacking the judgment can show that the class was
inadequately represented").
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apple treatment of the guarantee of adequacy, 6 ' courts, at least thus far,

maintain that a second (or what lawyers call a collateral) attack on
adequacy is allowed.' 66
But a court (or, for that matter, any institution or individual) may
say something is law and treat it as if it were not. To be law, as opposed
to a string of words, the phrases courts repeat must "mean" something.' 67

For words to mean something, two things must be true about them: they
must divide actions that occur in the world into valid and void, lawful
and unlawful; and they must entail real consequences. If any and all
conduct meets a particular "standard," or if the violation of the standard

never results in tangible consequences to the violator, we put it to you
that the "standard" is no "standard" and certainly not a rule of law. It is

at most a mantra, something that is repeated no matter what the
circumstances. It is mumbo-jumbo, not law.
"Class counsel has adequately represented the class" is a mantra.
Some form of that phrase can be found in virtually every class action
settlement opinion, seemingly without regard to what class counsel has

actually done.6' In most cases, the court does not even bother to
construct a story describing class counsel's activities. Instead, courts

content themselves by summarizing class counsel's resume in the most
laudatory terms and by making conclusory statements about how well-

165. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for "Adequacy" in
Class Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.765, 766 (1998) ("lAin
unfettered ability to collaterally attack 'adequacy' is not a well-designed solution ....
").
166. "Federal courts... recognize that absent class members hold a due process right to attack
collaterally the res judicata effects of a class action judgment if the absent class members establish
that the class representatives inadequately represented the interests of the class." Tompkins v. Ala.
State Univ., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1163 (N.D. Ala. 1998), aff'd, 174 F.3d 203 (1lth Cir. 1999). But
see Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1999) (declining to allow collateral attack
where court certifying the class action made sufficient findings on adequacy).
167. See 15A AM. JuR. 2D Common Law § 1 (2000).
168. For a small sampling, see Thomas v. Albright, 77 F. Supp. 2d 114, 119 (D.D.C. 1999)
("The Court, in approving the settlement, expressly found that class counsel adequately represented
the plaintiffs ....), aff'd sub nom. Thomas v. Powell, 247 F.3d 260 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 122
S. Ct. 347 (2001); Garza v. Sporting Goods Props., Inc., No. SA-93-CA-1082, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2009, at *18 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 1996) ("[The Court is satisfied class counsel has
adequately represented the class."); Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505, 524 (E.D. Tex.
1995) ("[T]he Court is satisfied that Class Counsel adequately represented the class."); Bartolomeo
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 92-5581, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9545, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July
14, 1993) (noting that plaintiffs were bound by earlier class action settlement in part because "class
counsel had adequately represented the class"); Hammon v. Barry, 752 F. Supp. 1087 app. at 1121
(D.D.C. 1990) (attaching in Appendix I the Consent Decree, item 36 of which reads, "Class
Counsel have adequately represented the class."); see also Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157
F.R.D. 246, 293-94 (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated, 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), aff'd sub nom. Amchem
Prods, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), discussed in more detail infra note 169.

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 30:129

respected, talented and above reproach class counsel is.' 69 In most cases,
in other words, courts are too busy heaping praise on class counsel to
describe what they have done to represent the class, to elaborate on what
the rule of adequacy demands of class counsel or to explain why it
makes sense to hold that what class counsel did satisfies the law. It is
true that some courts discuss class counsel's actions at length. 70 But this
is almost always to respond to an objector who has a lawyer to present a
case challenging what class counsel has done, and that is a rare
occurrence for reasons we explained earlier.' 7' More important, even in
those cases, the courts manage not to create any law of adequacy,
leaping as they do from the actions of counsel to the conclusion that
those actions are adequate without pausing
to explain the content of the
17
standard they purport to be applying. 1
Conduct described by class action lawyers and stamped as adequate
has included the following: negotiating a class settlement that leaves
some members of the class paying more in attorneys' fees than they
receive in recovery; m negotiating a deal for the class that is worse than
the deal simultaneously negotiated by the same lawyers for identically
169. See, e.g., Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 246, 293-94. The court not once but repeatedly praised
class counsel: reciting the credentials of class counsel and emphasizing their long experience as
leaders of the asbestos plaintiffs' bar, see id. at 293-94; finding class counsel to be "highly respected
for their skills and experience in the asbestos litigation" and to "have the knowledge and credibility
necessary to negotiate on behalf of future asbestos victims," id. at 294; noting that "[aill three Class
Counsel were unquestionably experienced, highly respected leaders of the plaintiffs' asbestos bar,"
id. at 329; describing class counsel as "extraordinarily competent and experienced" and "highly
respected," and asserting that "it is clear to this Court that they intended to negotiate this settlement
in compliance with the ethical rules," id. at 335; see also S.C. Nat'l Bank v. Stone, 139 F.R.D. 325,
331 (D.S.C. 1991) ("Plaintiffs' counsel have now practiced before this court in a number of
securities fraud class actions, and the court is aware from first-hand experience of their competency
in this complex area of law. The court is satisfied that the plaintiffs and their class counsel will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."); In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec.
Litig., 720 F. Supp. 1379, 1392 (D. Ariz. 1989) ("Both Class counsel and counsel for Chemical
Bank deem the settlements to be fair, reasonable, adequate and deserving of the Court's approval.
Counsels' opinions warrant great weight both because of their considerable familiarity with this
litigation and because of their extensive experience in similar actions.").
170. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d

768, 801-04 (3d Cir. 1995).
171. See supra notes 145-53 and accompanying text.
172. See generally Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem
Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1045, 1057, 1090-92 (1995) (noting that standards of adequacy,
because they are not well defined, can often be manipulated by class counsel).
173. See Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506, 508 (7th Cir. 1996) (describing
lower court's decision in Hoffman v. BancBoston Mortgage Corp., No. 91-1880 (Ala. Cir. CL Jan.
24, 1994)). Kamilewicz, the subsequent malpractice suit by a class member against class counsel
and the defendant bank's lawyers, affirmed dismissal on procedural grounds without considering the
merits of the claims against the lawyers. See id. at 512. See Koniak & Cohen, supra note 83, at
1057-84, for a comprehensive discussion and critique of these cases.
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situated people outside the class;174 negotiating a deal that gives members
of the class with no viable claims as good a recovery as those with
viable, even strong, claims; 75 negotiating a deal without conducting any
discovery; 76 and devising settlement notices that the average citizen
could not hope to understand)"
In one recent case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals broke from
7
the pack and put some teeth in the standard of adequate representation. 1
174. See Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505, 524-25 (E.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd sub nom.
In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996), and vacated and remanded, 521 U.S. 1114
(1997), and aff'd, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998), and vacated and rev'd sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). For a discussion and critique of this case, see George M. Cohen, The
"Fair"is the Enemy of the Good: Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corporation and Class Action Settlements,
8 Sup. Cr. ECON. REv. 23 (2000). See also Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 298.
175. See, e.g., In re Paine Webber Short Term U.S. Gov't Income Fund See. Litig., No. 94 Civ.
3820, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12029, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1995) (approving settlement in
which those with claims barred by the statute of limitations were provided the same relief as those
without time-barred claims); Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., 641 So. 2d 888, 891 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994) (describing settlement providing that those flight attendants with claims barred by the statute
of limitations would have the statute waived to allow them the same relief as those without timebarred claims).
Susan Koniak, one of the Authors of this Essay, testified as an expert witness in the Paine
Webber fairness hearing on behalf of the objectors. She was paid for the time she spent preparing to
testify and testifying. In her testimony, she criticized the settlement, interalia, on the ground that
those with time-barred claims were treated as if they were similarly situated to those with timely
claims. The court rejected her testimony on this and other points.
176. A practice known as "confirmatory discovery" has developed in the settlement of class
actions. Confirmatory discovery refers to the discovery that class counsel conducts after agreeing to
a settlement on behalf of the class. See, e.g., Michael A. Riccardi, Phila. Lawyers Negotiate $30
Million Settlement in Securities Class Action, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 5, 1997, at 1 ('The
company said that 'confirmatory discovery' must take place as well as the negotiation of a detailed
settlement stipulation."); Micro Warehouse, Inc. Settles Class Action Lawsuit, PR NEwswIRE, Sept.
3, 1997 ('The agreement [to pay thirty million dollars] is contingent on completion of confirmatory
discovery."), available at LEXIS, PR Newswire File; SFX BroadcastingAnnounces Settlement of
Lawsuits, Bus. WiRE, Mar. 18, 1998 ('The settlement is conditioned on the consummation of the
merger, the completion of confirmatory discovery, and approval of the court."), available at LEXIS,
Business Wire File.
177. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 177 F.R.D. 216, 231-32
(D.N.J. 1997) (asserting that notice is adequate as long as it satisfies "the necessary requirements,"
but that it does not need to be "unduly specific"). But see Zimmer Paper Prods., Inc. v. Berger &
Montague, P.C., 758 F.2d 86, 93 (3d Cir. 1985) (recognizing a cause of action by a class member
against class counsel for negligence in providing notice).
178. See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 1995) [Epstein 1], rev'd sub. nom.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996); see also Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 126
F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1996) [Epstein III (Epstein I on remand), withdrawn and replaced, 179 F.3d 641
(9th Cir. 1999) [Epstein 111]. Shareholders for a corporation acquired in a tender offer brought two
related actions, the first one making claims under state corporate law and filed in Delaware, and the
second making claims under the federal securities laws and fried in federal court. See Epstein I11,
179 F.3d at 643. The trial court in the federal case granted the acquiring corporation's summary
judgment motion. See id. While the shareholders' appeal in that suit was pending, the Delaware
Chancery Court approved a settlement extinguishing the shareholders' state and federal claims, even
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In a very detailed opinion, the court explained what class counsel had
done and why that conduct fell short of the standard. 79 This glaring
exception to the otherwise cavalier approach to adequacy demonstrated
by our courts was soon relegated to the scrap heap by the very court that
issued the opinion, however. Months after the decision was issued, the
Ninth Circuit panel ordered reargument in the case and issued a new
opinion on the matter of adequacy, vacating the prior opinion, with one
judge from the prior panel switching his vote. ° The new opinion
effectively immunizes from collateral attack the cursory treatment courts
typically give to adequate representation."'
On the other hand, the Supreme Court this term in Ortiz undertook
to pour some meaning into adequate representation. 112 Recognizing that
conflicts of interest among class members translate into a conflict of

though the state court did not have jurisdiction over the federal claims. See id. Although the Ninth
Circuit reversed that approval, see Epstein I, 50 F.3d at 648, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit, holding that the state court's judgment approving the settlement had preclusive effect in the
federal courts under the Full Faith and Credit Act. See Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 369, 387. On
remand, the Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme Court had left open the issue of whether the
settlement could be collaterally attacked on grounds of inadequate representation. See Epstein I!,
126 F.3d at 1237-38, 1240. The Ninth Circuit further held in Epstein If that the adequate
representation issue was not fully and fairly litigated in the state court suit, and so the consideration
of the issue was not precluded in the federal suit; that the objectors' participation in the state
settlement hearing did not bind absent class members on the adequate representation issue; that the
shareholders could collaterally attack the adequacy of their representation at the state settlement
hearing; that a conflict of interest between class counsel in the state court action and the plaintiff
class rendered representation inadequate; and that the state class counsel's failure to vigorously
pursue the class members' federal claims was inadequate representation. See id. at 1240-52.
179. See id. at 1251-55.
180. See Epstein 111, 179 F.3d at 642-43. The two judges in the majority did not agree on the
rationale for reversing the prior decision. One judge concluded that the Supreme Court, in its
opinion holding that the state court judgment approving the settlement was entitled to full faith and
credit in the federal courts, had already implicitly held that the state court judgment did not violate
due process; thus, there could be no collateral attack on the judgment. See id. at 644. The judge who
switched his vote did not agree that the Supreme Court had conclusively resolved the due process
issue, but nevertheless found that the state courts had fully and fairly litigated the adequacy of
representation, despite his personal reservations about the settlement. See id. at 650 (Wiggins, J.,
concurring). The full and fair litigation consisted of the state court's conclusory statement that the
settlement was in the best interest of the class despite the charges of inadequate representation that
several objectors had raised. See id. at 651.
181. See, e.g., Patrick Woolley, The Availability of Collateral Attack for Inadequate
Representation in Class Suits, 79 TEX. L. REV. 383, 384 (2000) (noting that recent circuit court
decisions, notably Epstein, have ignored or rejected the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Hansberryv. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), that absent class members have a right of collateral attack on
the class judgment for inadequate representation).
182. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856-59 (1999).
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interest problem for class counsel,'8 and that class counsel conflicts are
relevant to whether or not the class has received adequate representation,
the Court held that if these conflicts are severe enough the class must be
divided into subclasses with separate representation to insure adequate
representation.'8 Specifically, the Court held that two such conflicts
existed in Ortiz: the conflict between holders of present and future
claims, and the conflict between claimants exposed to asbestos before
and after the expiration of the defendant's most significant insurance
policy."" Although we find the Court's attempt to put some meaning into
adequate representation encouraging, the Court did not give much
guidance about what other kinds of conflicts might create problems of
adequate representation." 6 At this point it is uncertain what impact the
Court's opinion will have on class action practice and the lower courts.
The extant "law" prohibiting collusion is as illusory as that
guaranteeing adequacy.'" One must search high and low for a court
decision rejecting a class settlement on the ground that it was
collusive." Unlike adequacy, collusion is sometimes defined by the
courts.'89 Nevertheless, the definition sets such a high bar for "collusive"
conduct, equating it with acts that would constitute criminal fraud, that
the definition itself seems to guarantee the "no collusion" result."9 After
all, most judges would be highly unlikely to accuse class counsel and the
defendant of the equivalent of criminal conduct on the basis of the
183. See id. at 856 n.31 ("'Mhe adequacy of representation enquiry is... concerned with the
'competency and conflicts of class counsel"') (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591,626 n.20 (1997)).
184. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 856.
185. See id. at 856-57. According to the Court, "[w]hile at some point there must be an end to
reclassification with separate counsel, these two instances of conflict are well within the
requirement of structural protection recognized in Amchem." Id. at 857.
186. See id. at 856 (stating that "class settlements must provide 'structural assurance of fair and
adequate representation for the diverse groups and individuals affected' but falling to explain what
such assurance would entail (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627)).
187. The discussion in this paragraph is based in part on Koniak, supra note 172, at 1117-20.
188. For instance, in the Federal Judicial Center study cited earlier, "collusion with the
opposing party" was raised the least often of all objections during settlement hearings in the districts
surveyed. See WILLGING Er AL., supra note 142, at 178 tbl.38. If collusion is raised so infrequently
as an objection, it is even less likely that a settlement will be rejected on that basis. See also Koniak,
supranote 172, at 1120 n.349.
189. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 331 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (citing
Point Pleasant Canoe Rental, Inc. v. Tinicum Township, 110 F.R.D. 166, 169 (E.D. Pa. 1986) which
in turn quotes BLACK'S LAv DICTIONARY 240 (5th ed. 1979), to define "collusion"), vacated, 83
F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), aff'd sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); see
also Koniak, supra note 172, at 1118.
190. See Koniak, supranote 172, at 1119 (asserting that while colluders are generally guilty of
a crime, it is impractical to hold criminal conduct as the threshold for disqualifying class counsel).
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scanty information likely to be available to the court on what these
lawyers actually did in negotiating a class settlement and what their
intent was in doing what they did.19' Whether the high bar for collusion
is primarily responsible or not, the fact is that the collusion standard
does not work any better than the adequacy standard to mark conduct as
lawful or unlawful.' 92 Put another way, when nothing is collusive, the
collusion prohibition is not functioning as law.
This state of class action law is, of course, not lost on class counsel
and other lawyers in the class action world. 93 Once again, their dilemma
is not that they are tempted to act within the bounds of the law, yet
immorally. Nor is their dilemma simply that class action law is
uncertain, and so lawyers are tempted to go beyond the bounds they
convince themselves do not exist (or at least do not exist for them).
Rather, their ethical problem is that in a very real sense they are
operating in a world without law as we generally understand it.'94 Their
representation knows no bounds.
The absence of law to control lawyer conduct in class action cases
extends much further than we have thus far suggested. Class action
"law" imposes little structure on the entity of the class, and to the extent
it fails to do so, it leaves class counsel with what amounts in practice to
virtually unlimited discretion to create, control, and manipulate her
client: the class.1 95 A class is a unique entity in our legal system. 196 Its
true "owners," the class members, do not voluntarily form the entity.' 9
In fact, unlike any other legal entity, there is no law of class formation,
save for the skimpy requirements of Rule 23.19' Only recently did the

191. Seeid. at 1119n.346.
192. Seeid. at 1119-20.
193. Some of the class action's most strident critics are within the legal profession itself. See
HENSLER ET AL., supra note 23, at 83-84 (describing criticisms of class action attorneys by fellow
attorneys and the reaction of one plaintiffs attorney whose firm chose not to take on a potentially
meritorious consumer class action because the high attorneys' fees compared to the small damage
award would "make the firm 'look bad').
194. See id. at 79; see also supra notes 167-72, 186-92 and accompanying text.
195. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 23, at 71-72.
196. See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NoTRE DAME L.
REV. 913, 917 (1998) (describing the class as "an entity in itself for the critical purposes of
determining the nature of the lawsuit, the role of the lawyer and the judge, and the significance of
the disposition").
197. See id. at 921.
198. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Rule 23(a) states the prerequisites to a class action:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf
of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
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Supreme Court suggest that these requirements could not be bargained
away as part of a compromise settlement.'" Nor, unlike any other legal
entity, is there any law of "authority"--that is, decision-making powerwithin the class.20 Without this structural law as a foundation, ethics has
nothing on which to build.
Let us be concrete. While class action law demands that each class
have named representatives, the law nowhere defines what the
responsibilities of those representatives are either in relation to the rest
of the class or in relation to class counsel.20' The little courts do say
about the responsibilities of the named representatives suggests that
these "responsibilities" are nonexistent. For example, as we have already
discussed, courts have said that named representatives may be adequate
despite the fact that they know little, if anything, about the claims
asserted on the class's behalf, the settlement negotiated by counsel, or
the actions or conflicts of interests of counsel for the class.20 Moreover,
courts have held that class counsel may advocate and a court may
approve a settlement of a class action despite the objections of some or
even all of the named representatives.2°
In Amchem Products,Inc. v. Windsor,2 the Supreme Court referred
to the "representational responsibilities" of the named representatives
and insisted that separate named representatives be appointed for
subgroups within the class with differing interests ostensibly so that the
named representatives could fulfill their "responsibilities" to those
subgroups without being burdened by the need to advocate (or do
whatever named representatives are supposed to do) on behalf of groups
with widely divergent interests.' °s But the Supreme Court never said
what those representational responsibilities were. What point is there in
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Id.
199. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (noting that Rule 23(a)
requirements may be even more important in the settlement context).
200. See Shapiro, supra note 196, at 919 (noting that the "individual autonomy" of class
members is "severely limit[ed]").
201. See Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 13, 45 (1996) (noting that pending reform bills "implicitly reflect the view that class memberrepresentatives do not adequately fill the role of client").
202. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., TBK Partners, Ltd. v. W. Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 462 (2d Cir. 1982)
(explaining that the opposition of a majority of the class "cannot serve as an automatic bar to a
settlement... determine[d] to be manifestly reasonable").
204. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
205. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627 (citing In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d
721,742-43 (2d Cir. 1992)).
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insisting that separate named representatives be appointed for subgroups
within a class, if class counsel need not follow the direction of the
named representatives or even keep the named representatives informed
of the case's progress? The Supreme Court's decision is coherent if one
assumes, as the Court has since held in Ortiz, that the Court meant that
separate lawyers would be necessary to represent subgroups with
divergent interests within a larger class-as long, that is, as the courts
take seriously the notion that adequate counsel must advocate for the
interests of the class or subclass that she represents."' But the Court's
decision is incoherent if read against the backdrop of "law" that
demands nothing of the named representatives and gives those people no
power to affect what happens to the class.
Not only does class action law fail to structure the responsibilities
or powers of the named representatives, it says virtually nothing about
the relation of objectors to the class or to class counsel.2 ' Although
courts do say that the number of objectors is a factor to be considered by
the court, again class counsel is permitted to advocate and a court is free
to approve a settlement objected to by many or even most of the class.20
Objectors are technically still members of the class, but the case law is
silent on whether that means that objectors continue to be clients of class
counsel, despite their representation by others (in the rare case when
objectors appear through counsel), and is equally silent on what class
counsel's duties, if any, are to objectors, whether one imagines them to
be clients or not. Must class counsel give some Miranda-likewarning
206. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999); Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626 n.20.
207. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari on the question of whether objectors must
intervene in the proceeding to have standing to appeal. See Scardelletti v. Debarr, 265 F.3d 195 (4th
Cir.), cert. granted sub nor. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 122 S. Ct. 663 (2001). It is amazing that the
question of an objector's relation to the proceeding and standing to appeal has remained uncertain
for so long. For an argument that absent class members should have to object to the adequacy of
class counsel at the fairness hearing or lose their chance to raise this issue later on collateral attack,
see Kahan & Silberman, supra note 165, at 792. But see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797, 810 (1985) (stating that absent class members, unlike parties, need not do anything to preserve
their rights).
208. For example, courts have approved class action settlements in which the sole value
exchanged was warrants, even over the objections of class members. See, e.g., Blank v. Talley
Indus., Inc., 64 F.R.D. 125, 128, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); In re Brown Co. See. Litig., 355 F. Supp.
574, 576,590 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
209. In fact, courts are often more likely to find that there is not a conflict of interest between
objectors and the class with respect to adequate representation by counsel. See, e.g., John C. Coffee,
Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation,
100 COLuM. L. REv. 370, 407-08 (2000) (discussing a case, Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d
581 (3d Cir. 1999), wherein the court found the asserted conflict of interest insufficient to disqualify
class counsel despite an objector class of over 380 people, including three of the four named class
representatives); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 137, at 1192 (noting that the "analytic question"
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to unrepresented objectors, who all would have received notice that class
counsel will represent their interests.. There is no answer in law. May
class counsel help objectors to get a different and better deal from the
defendant to encourage the objectors to remain mute in court on the
problems the objectors have with the settlement offered to the class?
May class counsel help objectors to opt out of the class action after the
opt-out period has passed? Although both of these practices occur, we
believe, with some regularity, no
law speaks to their propriety, as far as
2
we have been able to ascertain. 1
The emptiness of the legal concepts of adequacy and collusion,
together with the law's failure to define the rights and responsibilities of
class counsel and the various constituent members of the class (named
representatives, objectors, opt-outs and absent members), combine to
create a free-zone of activity in which class lawyers can essentially do
what they please. 2 If one understands that in class action practice,
defense counsel and plaintiffs' counsel have much to gain by
cooperating to ensure that class counsel has wide discretion to dispose of
the claims of the absent class, it is fairly easy to understand how this
lawless state of affairs might result.2 3 Put simply, no subgroup within
the bar has a strong interest in seeing any other subgroup involved in this
area of practice constrained by the rule of law. With no subgroups within
the bar to argue for or construct law constraining lawyer conduct in this
field, we find no such law.
A better understanding of the relationship of lawyers to the law and
the complexity of the lawyer-client relationship is helpful not only in
illuminating what is happening in the world, but in identifying solutions
that might have a chance at working as well as sifting out those that
seem less promising. Expecting courts to develop the law of class
actions in a manner sufficiently protective of the class would, for
example, seem quite optimistic. Courts, even more than legislatures, are
dependent on the assistance of lawyers in the construction of sensible
involved in this dilemma is "whether class counsel can reasonably conclude that there is no
materially adverse interest among groups of clients and claimants because they (counsel) are so
good and able that they can negotiate effectively for all").
210. Compare this with the standard set for an organizational entity in MODEL RULES, supra
note 19, R. 1.13(d): "In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members,
shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when it is
apparent that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the
lawyer is dealing."
211. But see supra notes 146-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the system
operates to discourage attorneys from acting on behalf of objectors.
212. See supranotes 54-55 and accompanying text.
213. See supranotes 98-120 and accompanying text.
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law. Courts construct law, as we discussed earlier, largely by relying on
the arguments of lawyers.1 4 With lawyers dedicated to preserving a
lawless environment in which to operate, it is not surprising that class
action law has developed in so anemic a fashion. Similarly, the Advisory
Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure, a committee of the Federal
Judicial Center, would seem to be ill-suited to constructing class action
law because it is too dependent on input from class action lawyers in
framing its class action rules and too sensitive to the concerns of those
lawyers.1 5 Indeed, the Advisory Committee's class action "reform"
proposals have been aimed at increasing, not decreasing, the free-zone of
activity now enjoyed by lawyers in this field. 216 Legislatures, although
also dependent on lawyers, are in a relatively more independent position.
Not all legislators are lawyers and the legislature is more accessible than
the courts or the Advisory Committee to nonlawyers and their
concerns. 2 7 If anything is to be done about class action abuse, the
legislature is, in short, most likely to do it.
As to what needs to be done by the legislature and, in the
meantime, by responsible judges willing to rely less on lawyers to help
them construct law, the first step is to continue down the path the
Supreme Court started in Amchem and continued in Ortiz: to exorcise
the notion that the fact of a settlement is sufficient to determine either
the settlement's reasonableness, the lawyers' adequacy, or the absence
of collusion.2 1 To develop a standard that can serve as law, courts and
the legislature cannot look only to existing class action practice, which,
as we have argued, is effectively lawless.2 9 Instead, lawmakers must
extrapolate from, and draw analogies to, practices in areas where law

214. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
215. See Koniak & Cohen, supra note 83, at 1134-40 (discussing the proposal of the Advisory
Committee to amend Rule 23).
216. See id. at 1139.
217. See Shapiro, supra note 196, at 949 n.102 (noting that "'legislative' action is more
appropriate than judicial development for a major departure from traditional and accepted values");
see also David L. Shapiro, Courts,Legislatures,and Paternalism,74 VA. L. REV. 519, 521 (1988)
(noting that "in a society committed to the value of self-determination, courts should be reluctant to
act for paternalist reasons in the absence of legislative direction" and "legislatures should be freer
than courts to embark on paternalist courses, subject only to popular will and to limited
constitutional restraints") (emphasis added).
218. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 848-49 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619-20 (1997) (noting in both cases that certification in a settlement context
may even demand "heightened attention").
219. See supra notes 167-206 and accompanying text.
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binds and lends confidence, such as the law governing other types
of entities.220
Moreover, understanding that a lawyer's responsibilities to her
entity-client will inevitably be a function of that entity's structure helps
provide some direction. To decide what a class lawyer is supposed to
do-what constitutes adequate representation-the relationship of the
various components of a class to one another and then to the lawyer
must be fleshed out. The more ephemeral the client, the more abstract
and ultimately empty the lawyer's duty to that client will be. In short,
class action abuse will thrive as long as the components of a class are as
ill-defined as they are now.21 When one's client is unknowable or
incoherent, one's duty will always be unclear. The law needs to make
the class client coherent by explicating how its parts fit together and how
they are designed to interact with the lawyer. With meaningless law and
shapeless clients, the lawyer's self-interest is her only guide. The
unchecked self-interest of lawyers drives class action practice today.
That needs to change, and asking the right questions is the first step.
In hell there will be lawyers without clients or law.22 It is time legal
ethics scholars talked about that.

220. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of how ethics rules apply
when dealing with a corporation as a client.
221. See supranotes 194-213 and accompanying text.
222. This warning (repeated in the title of this Essay) is inspired by Grant Gilmore's famous
closing to his book, The Ages of American Lav: "In Heaven there will be no law, and the lion will
lie down with the lamb.... In Hell there will be nothing but law, and due process will be
meticulously observed." GRANT GnMORE, THE AGES OF AmERICAN LAW 111 (1977).

